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OBSCENITY: THE INTRACTABLE
LEGAL PROBLEM
JOHN CORNELIUS HAYES *

L AST

the editor of The Catholic Lawyer asked me to
comment on two 1968 decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, each dealing with the Federal constitutionality of local criminal laws prohibiting the dissemination to youth of materials obscene
for youth though not obscene for adults. In the one case, a New
York statute met the test of Federal constitutionality,' but in the
2
other, a Dallas ordinance failed that test.
AUGUST,

The editor asked me about the cases because in 1962 I had
published for him a survey of a decade of decisions (mostly by the
United States Supreme Court) dealing with the Federal constitutionality of laws seeking to control the dissemination of obscene
films and publications;' and he knew that I had since tried to keep
abreast of later developments in that constitutional area in my role
as occasional legal consultant for the National Office for Decent
Literature in Chicago. He probably did not know that I have also
published another law review article in this area under the unintentional pseudonym of John Cornelius Levy, for which, to set the
record straight, I hereby acknowledge responsibility.4
My comment, in summary, is that the two cases are not inconsistent, either with each other or with Gault;' that the Dallas case,
while appearing from the majority opinion to be merely a throw-back
to a long line of decisions between 1952 and 1957 in which local
criminal laws were held unconstitutionally vague, really sheds new
light on those prior decisions, thanks largely to the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan and to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which Mr. Justice Black joined; and that the New York
case is another milestone on the road from primitivism to relative
sophistication in what Mr. Justice Harlan terms this intractable constitutional legal problem.
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College, Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law.
'Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
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The Dallas Case
I deal first with the Dallas case. By
way of background, recall that, in 1952,
Burstyn , overruled the 1915 decision of
Mutual Film Corporation by holding
for the first time that films were within
the protection of the First Amendment.
On that basis, Burstyn then held that a
standard for the legal control of films expressed in terms of the adjective "sacrilegious" was unconstitutionally vague.
There followed a five-year sequence of
decisions, both federal and state, in which
adjective after adjective in local laws
designed to control films (and then, later,
publications as well) was shot down as
unconstitutionally vague for materials
within First Amendment
protection.
Finally, in 1957, in Roth and Alberts,"
the single adjective "obscene" was held,
for both local and Federal criminal laws:
(a)
to describe material not within
First Amendment protection (because
textually the unconditional wording of
the First Amendment was not intended
in 179.1 as a literal absolute, and because functionally the obscene lacked
the slightest redeeming social importance, so that its prohibition did not
impair the protected social value of
freedom of expression); and
(b)
to have been so adequately defined and fleshed out with standards
by American case law as not to be
unconstitutionally vague in respect to

",Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236
U.S. 230 (1915).
S Roth
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such relatively unprotected materials
(presumably because it met the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process test of adequately informing
all involved of the nature of the prohibited acts and materials).
I say "relatively unprotected materials".
The constitutional significance of the distinction between materials protected by
the First Amendment (as applied to all
local governments by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)
and materials protected, not by the First
Amendment, but merely by the substantive due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was not very
clearly delineated in Roth. One of the
chief contributions of GinsbergO (commented on hereafter) is that, in my
opinion, it clarifies that distinction in
several respects.
If the material is within First Amendment protection so that the highly
protected social value of freedom of
expression is involved, then, to justify
governmental control of that material,
the burden of proof is on the government;
and the evidence required to sustain that
burden must be scientifically verifiable
and not mere opinion evidence; and such
evidence must prove that a "clear and
present danger" exists to a social value
which, under the prevailing circumstances,
is of an even higher order of importance
to the common good than the value of
freedom of expression; and the method
and degree and duration of the control
involved must be limited precisely to the
extent necessary to cope with that "clear

v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);

Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.

476

(1957).

9Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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and present danger".
If, on the other hand, the material
is not within First Amendment protection,
so that the social value of freedom of
expression is not involved, the burden of
proof is on the objector; his evidence
must prove that the government was
unreasonable (irrational) either in discerning an adverse relationship between
the common good and the material to
be controlled, or in its selection of the
method of control (either because the
selected method is irrelevant to the
control sought, or because the selected
method
represents
an
unreasonable
"over-kill", or because the government
has formulated its control so loosely as
not reasonably to apprize the persons
involved as to the nature of the prohibited conduct or materials); and the
counter-evidence of the government to
support its reasonableness (rationality)
need not be scientifically verifiable, but
may be mere opinion evidence, at least
when scientifically verifiable evidence
either does not exist or is so inconclusive
in respect to the constitutional issue
being raised as to make it impossible
to categorize the opinion as unreasonable
(irrational).
The Dallas ordinance here involved
provided for the classification of films,
prior to their initial exhibition in Dallas,
as "suitable" or "not suitable" for youths
under sixteen years of age.
But the
suitability of a film for such youths did
not depend solely on the standard that
the film was or was not "obscene" for
such youths; if it had, the case would
have been like Ginsberg.10 In fact, how-

ever, under the ordinance, a film was
also "not suitable" if it portrayed, among
several other things, "sexual promiscuity",
a term defined neither in the ordinance l
nor in any constructions given to the term
either by the Dallas Board of Censors
or by the Texas courts. The holding is
that, as to a film within First Amendment
protection because it is not obscene,
the descriptive phrase "sexual promiscuity" is unconstitutionally vague; and
that the vices of such vagueness are not
rendered any the less objectionable by
the fact that the ordinance was designed
to protect children. Given the case precedents, the decision is routine. Mr.
Justice Harlan alone dissented, and he
solely on the basis of his own self-styled
"functional" approach (which he has
urged from the very beginning in Roth),
under which, as to state and local laws,
all that is required is that the law, even
as to material within First Amendment
protection, stopped short of being "prudishly overzealous"; on that tolerant approach, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that
the concept of "sexual promiscuity" was
at least as precise as the concept of "ob2
scenity" in Roth.1
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is enlightening, because it helps to make clear
that the basic problem has seldom been
with the adjectives used by the legislatures. Most of the adjectives (or descriptive phrases such as "sexual promiscuity") were sufficiently precise to meet
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process test of reasonably apprizing

'
10

Id.

12

A defect since remedied by an amendment.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

15
all persons involved of the nature of the
prohibited acts or materials so as reasonably to enable actors to judge for themselves whether they were or were not
within the prohibited area. The real
trouble with the adjectives was that they
described materials within the protection
of the First Amendment so that the control of those materials, no matter how
reasonably described they may have been,
impaired the superior social value of
freedom of expression. Instead, however,
of saying that, the cases castigated the
adjectives as being "unconstitutionally
vague".
To date (except for libel),
only "obscene" describes materials not
within First Amendment protection and
(by coincidence?) only "obscene" is not
"unconstitutionally vague". Mr. Justice
Harlan cannot see that "sexual promiscuity" is any more vague than "obscene",
and of course it is not. But the real
point is that, for the majority, "sexual
promiscuity" describes materials within
First Amendment protection, whereas, for
Mr. Justice Harlan, it describes materials
which a state may quarantine from
youths under sixteen without being
"prudishly overzealous".
Re-thinking Burstyn, 13 is there really
anything fatally vague about the adjective
"sacrilegious"? The real prolem with it
is that it describes materials clearly within
First Amendment protection because, in
the free trade of ideas, "sacrilegious"
materials inevitably involve ideas as to
the existence of God, as to "whose God",
and so on. For that same reason, despite

13 Joseph

Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,

495 (1952).

343
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the dictum in Roth 14 as to blasphemy
not having been intended to be within
First Amendment protection, I would
expect that the adjective "blasphemous"
in a criminal statute prohibiting the sale
of blasphemous materials would be held
"unconstitutionally vague"-not, in my
opinion, because it is, but because it
describes materials within First Amendment protection.
Significantly, Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined by Mr. Justice Black, filed a concurring opinion. He concurred, he said,
because of his position that the First
Amendment is always involved in the
censorship of anything. But, he added,
were it not for that position, he would
concur with Mr. Justice Harlan, because
''sexual promiscuity" is adequately precise
to meet the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
only. What it cannot do is meet the
test of collision with the First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression.
The significance of the Dallas case,
therefore, lies for me in the light which
the dissenting and concurring opinions
throw upon the real thrust of the majority
opinion (and of the 1952-1957 cases
which it follows) in finding fault with
adjectives, most of which by hindsight
appear quite adequate to meet the substantive due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment alone.
I should, I think, now outline the
majority opinion in the Dallas case so
as to acquaint the reader with what I
now think is the misleading traditional

U.S.
1' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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treatment of the problem of the descriptive adjectives.
The Dallas ordinance" required an
exhibitor, prior to initial exhibition, to
propose to a Board of Censors that a
film be classified either as "suitable" or
as "not suitable" for young persons under
sixteen. The decision was then for the
Board. The ordinance was painstaking
in providing adjective due process and
prompt judicial superintendence, except
that it did not require the Board to give
reasons for its own "not suitable" classification or even to specify upon what
standard in the ordinance its classification
was based. If an exhibitor shows a "not
suitable" film, he may commit a misdemeanor (punishable by a fine of up
to $200) under any of several circumstances.

It defined "likely to incite or encourage
crime, delinquency or sexual promiscuity
by youths" as involving, in the Board's
judgment, a substantial probability that
the fim would create the impression in
youths that such conduct is profitable,
desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy, or commonly accepted. 7 And
it defined "likely to appeal to the prurient
interest of youths" as meaning that, in
the Board's judgment, the calculated or
dominant effect of the film on youths
was substantially to arouse their sexual
desire. The ordinance further provided
that, in determining that a fim was "not
suitable", the Board must consider the
film as a whole, and must determine
whether its harmful effects outweigh the
artistic or educational values which the
film might have for youths.'

The ordinance defined "not suitable"
as follows: 16

Under this ordinance, the Board, contrary to the proposal of the exhibitor,
determined that a film was "not suitable".
The exhibitor refused to accept this classification, as did the distributor. The
Board thereupon promptly sought an injunction against each prohibiting any
showing of the film without compliance
with the requirements for a "not suitable"
film, on the ground that the film portrayed sexual promiscuity in a manner
likely to incite sexual promiscuity by
youths and likely to appeal to their pru-

(1)

(2)

describing or portraying brutality,
criminal violence or depravity in a
manner which the Board judges
likely to incite or encourage crime
or delinquency by youths; or
describing or portraying nudity beyond the customary limits of candor in Dallas, or describing or
portraying sexual promiscuity or
extra-marital or abnormal sexual
relationships in a manner which
the Board judges likely to incite or
encourage delinquency or sexual
promiscuity by youths, or as likely
to appeal to the prurient interest
of youths.

15DALLAS,

ORD., ch.
1f

DALLAS,

TEX.,

REV.

CODE,

CIV.

&

CRIM.

CODE,

CIV.

&

GRIM.

46A (1960).
TEX.,

REV.

ORD., ch. 46A-1(f) 1960).

17 Under
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S.
684 (1959), this standard would appear inadequate for a film within First Amendment protection because it was not obscene.
18The latter provision appears to conflict with
the decision in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964).

15
rient interest. No attempt was made,
however, to support the allegation of the
likelihood of the film to appeal to the
prurient interest of youths. The trial
court issued the injunction, and Texas
The United
appellate courts affirmed.
States Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the phrase "sexual promiscuity" was unconstitutionally vague.
The opinion of the United
Supreme Court runs as follows:
(1)

(2)

(3)
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States

Since films are within First
Amendment protection, precision
of regulation must be the touchstone.
While it is constitutional to require that films be submitted to
a licensing Board prior to their
initial exhibition, this Court has
firmly insisted on adequate procedural safeguards and prompt
judicial superintendence.
The vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced when expression
is being subjected to licensing
as a form of prior restraint, because that is a process in which
we cannot leave too wide a play
to those administering the ordinance, especially since doing so
hampers effective judicial review
even when de novo, and promotes erratic administration. In
addition, the First Amendment
interests involved here reach beyond those of the film makers,
distributors, and exhibitors and
beyond those of the youths to
those of adult filmgoers who will
be affected 'by any tendency
among film makers, distributors

(5)
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or exhibitors to play it safe under
the threat of this ordinance.
Nor is vagueness any the less
objectionable simply because the
ordinance does not suppress but
classification;
requires
merely
nor because the ordinance is
designed to protect children.
Control of expression to a child
is unrelated to tolerable vagueness because the vices of lack of
guidance to expressioners, to administrators, and to judicial
superintendents remain the same.
In Ginsberg, we held that, owing
to its interest in youth, a State
may regulate dissemination to
youth of, and youth's access to,
material "harmful to minors"
though not to adults. But in
Ginsberg "harmful to minors"
was statutorily defined so as
specifically and narrowly to define the phrase in accord with
standards which we have established for judging obscenity.
Here we merely hold that any
governmental regulation for youth
must meet the usual requirements
for narrowly drawn and reasonable standards.

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas and the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan have already been
presented.
The New York Case
I preface my comments on Ginsberg 19
by saying that the Federal constitutional
issues involved in the legal control of
'9Ginsberg

(1968).

v.

New

York,

390

U.S.

629
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obscenity appear to me to classify in one
of four categories:
(1)

Problems relating to the substantive definition of, and the standards for identifying, obscenity
and to the justification for any
legal control whatever.

(2)

Problems relating to the method
of control selected by legislators
(e.g., post-publication criminal
prosecution; injunctive control
without interim seizure of the
materials; the prior restraint
method of licensing of films; the
use of administrative agencies to
determine the applicability of
standards to particular materials).

(3)

Problems relating to adjective
due process involved in the selected method of control (e.g.,
search warrant procedures; interim seizure of materials pending judicial determination of their
obscenity; adequate notice and
hearing requirements to bar ex
parte proceedings; the necessity
for government to seek prompt
judicial superintendence in an
adversary proceeding; the necessity for trial by jury).
Problems relating to trial (the
necessity or admissibility of expert testimony as to contemporary community standards of decency; allocation of the burden
of proof) and to appellate review, whether of determinations
of administrative agencies, of
juries, or of lower courts sitting
without a jury.

(4)

Ginsberg falls into the first category.
Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, formulated the Federal constitutional issue
presented by the case as follows: the issue is the Federal constitutionality on
its face of a New York criminal statute
which prohibits the sale to minors under
seventeen of material defined in the
statute as obscene for minors under
seventeen (irrespective of whether the
material would be obsence for persons
seventeen or over) by adapting to minors
under seventeen the definition and standards of obscenity developed by decisions
of this Court beginning with Roth in
1957 (emphasis mine).
To orient the case so as to appreciate
its contribution to the evolving law in
the first category of problems, a review
of the prior cases in this category is
appropriate.
(A) The modern American constitutional definition of, and some of the
amplifying standards for the identification
of, obscenity were first established in
1957 in Roth,2 0 which discarded as utterly inadequate the older English test
12
as formulated in Queen v. Hicklin.
The definition of obscene material is
"material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest".
A footnote sets out the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code definition
of "prurient interest" as a "shameful or

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
This English test was objectionable because
20

21 Queen

it was formulated in terms of the susceptible person rather than the average person, in terms
of a part only rather than of the whole, and

in terms of a theme rather than of the dominant theme.

15
morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion". The footnote also expresses the
opinion that there is no significant difference between this judicial definition
and the definition then tentatively proposed in the Model Penal Code:
"A
thing is obscene if, considered as a
whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest . . . and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation
of such matters." The amplifying standard for identifying obscene material is
whether, to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the questioned material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren took the position to which
he has consistently adhered: government
may constitutionally punish only those
persons who are plainly engaged in the
commercial exploitation of the morbid
and shameful craving for materials having
a prurient effect. In Ginzburg,2 2 this
factor of pandering, whether intrusive or
welcome to the audience, was finally incorporated as a factor to be considered
in the determination of the obscenity of
materials.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his opinion concurring in Alberts but dissenting in Roth,
also took the position to which he has
consistently adhered and to which he
returned so forcefully in Ginsberg:2
We must distinguish between Federal
laws and State laws. Because the Fed-
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eral Government has no police power as
such over sexual matters, and because
the Federal Government is more strictly
controlled by the prohibition of the First
Amendment than is any State, and because any Federal control of obscenity
would necessarily involve a single standard for the whole nation (which would
be tolerable only for the worst hard-core
pornography), it follows that the Federal Government must be limited in the
area of obscenity to the control of hardcore pornography only;2 4 but the States
need not observe the same limitation. In
concurring in Ginsberg, Mr. Justice Harlan took the occasion to develop what,
in his self-styled "functional" approach,
the State limitation under the Federal Constitution should be: simply not to become "prudishly overzealous". This tolerant limitation, of course, would give
the States a great deal more leeway than
they now have under the Federal constitutional limitations of Roth and the
later cases adding to the Roth standards for obscenity.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined
by Mr. Justice Black, took the position
to which they have consistently adhered:
One must distinguish as sharply as possible between expression and antisocial
conduct.
Owing to the First Amendment, which covers any and every form
of mere expression (except libel?), no
government in this country may control
mere expression, including obscene expression as defined by the majority. An-

his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. at 197 (1964), Mr. Justice
Stewart agreed, but extended this limitation to
State and local law as well.'
24In

22Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
2 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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tisocial conduct only is the proper area
for governmental control. Occasionally,
expression may be inseparably brigaded
with antisocial conduct; only if, and only
to the extent that, this is the case, may
government control expression. Possibly,
if it could be proved by scientifically verifiable evidence that a certain form of
expression will be translated into overt
antisocial conduct, government might be
able to control that form of expression
to the extent necessary to prevent the
cause from producing the effect.2 5 The
dissenters, therefore, denied the validity
of each of the three grounds advanced in
the opinion of the Court to support the
holding that obscene expression was not
2
within First Amendment protection: r
(I) Not only has the Court never so held
(a point which the opinion of the Court
conceded),.but no form of expression except the libelous utterance in Beau-

25This hint appears again as a possible nega-

tive inference in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959). In that case, the Court held
that, with respect to a film which was not
obscene and which was therefore within First
Amendment protection, the mere advocacy of
the idea that adultery (a crime under State
law), under certain circumstances, was socially
acceptable and approved conduct for a mar-

ried person, without any effort in the manner
of presentation of that idea to incite anyone to
commit adultery, could not constitutionally be
suppressed by government. The negative in-

ference that an incitational manner of pre-

harnais 27 has ever been held to be outside First Amendment protection; nor
do any prior decisions support the conclusion that obscenity has always been
assumed to be outside First Amendment
protection (or, as expressed in the Ginsberg dissent: 2 I cannot interpret occasional utterances suggesting that obscenity was not protected by the First
Amendment as considered expressions of
the views of any particular Justices of
this Court). (2) As to freedom of expression, the First Amendment is literally all-encompassing: "No law" means no
law. (3) The functional ground is invalid since neither a court nor a community has any adequate basis for judging that a mere expression has no redeeming social importance, because no
scientifically verifiable evidence is available to support that judgment, and no
other type of evidence will suffice.
I have always had difficulty in understanding this insistence on scientifically
verifiable evidence.
My difficulty has
been in determining whether it is intended to apply only to the control of material within First Amendment protection
or equally to the control of material not
within First Amendment protection. If
to the latter, I have already protested the
application of any such requirement to
material protected solely by the substantive due process test of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
The evidence alluded to
in the opinion of the Court in Roth in

sentation of that idea might constitutionally be
suppressed is, of course, subject to the usual

infirmity of negative inferences, and no reference
is made as to the type of evidence which would
be required

to demonstrate

the

incitational

character of the material.
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
et seq. (1957).

27
28

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 654

n.4 (1968).
29Levy, A Position on the Control of Obscenity, 51 Ky. L.J. 641, 646-48 (1963).

15
support of the conclusion that obscene
expression, as there defined, has always
been regarded as wholly lacking any redeeming social importance was the opinion evidence of the Federal and State
legislatures as manifested in their enactment of anti-obscenity criminal statutes
to express the public policy of their
respective jurisdictions and, incidentally,
as re-manifested in their uniform re-enactment of such statutes after their existing statutes had been fatally flawed by
the constitutional requirement of scienter
in Smith v. California.30 The dissenters rejected this evidence, not, as I now
understand it, because they denied the
probative force of opinion evidence, but
simply because opinion evidence was inadequate for the task presented; only
scientifically verifiable evidence would suffice. The opinion of the Court in Roth
appeared to concede that the opinion evidence would be inadequate to support a
"clear and present danger" exception for
material within First Amendment protection, but thought that it was adequate
to support control of material protected
solely by the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. My difficulty has now been cleared up by the dissenters themselves in
their dissenting opinion in Ginsberg. 31
While continuing to insist that all expression as such (except libel?) is within First Amendment protection (for which
reason they dissent), they state that, if
the governmental control were to be
tested solely by the substantive due
30

Smith v. California, 361 U.S.

31 Ginsberg
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process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment alone, they would have no
difficulty in sustaining its constitutionality
under prior decisions because many persons think that obscene publications have
a harmful effect on the young, for which
reason the New York Legislature can
not be deemed wholly irrational in enacting the control. Hence, they accept
the opinion evidence of "modern Comstockians" as adequate to support the
judgment of the New York Legislature
under the substantive due process test of
the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in
the absence of scientifically verifiable
counter-evidence which conclusively establishes the fallacy of the opinion.
(B)
Subsequent United States Supreme Court cases both added to and refined the standards to be used in identifying the obscene:
(1) In 1959, Smith 3 2 added, as
a requirement for the Federal constitutionality of a State criminal statute, the
element of scienter, i.e., the statute must
require, as an essential element of the
crime of possessing or dealing in obscene materials, that the accused know, or
be reasonably chargeable with having
known, the nature of the contents of
the material. Some ramifications of this
requirement still remain undecided. It
is not yet entirely clear that anything less
than actual knowledge will suffice. And
several jurisdictions have created rebuttable presumptions as to the existence of
the required knowledge, the Federal constitutionality of which presumptions has
not yet been tested.

147 (1959).

v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650

(1968) (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas
and Black).

:-Smith

v. California, 361

U.S. 147 (1959).
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In 1962, Manual Enterprises33
(2)
extended the requirement of scienter to
Federal non-criminal law (a postal regulation). The case involved magazines
The
intended for male homosexuals.
Court held that, especially when the factor of dominant prurient appeal was limited to a particular group in the community, the constitutionality of federal
control of the distributor, by means of
postal regulations which banned the use
of the mails for distribution of the
magazines to everybody, required that
the magazines be patently offensive to
contemporary community standards of
decency (which they were not), i.e., that
the indecency of the magazines for the
community as a whole be self-demonstrating.. 4 Moreover, since the control
involved was a federal postal regulation,
the "community" was the entire nation.
This requirement of patent offensiveness to the community as a whole has
since been regarded by the Court as an
additional standard for the identification
of obscenity. I have never been able to
understand this construct of the decision.
In my view, the decision merely represents an application of the constitutional
principle established by Butler v. Michigan.3 5 In that case, a Michigan criminal statute prohibited the sale to anybody in the community of publications
which were obscene for children; as the

X'Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
34 This decision had been foreshadowed by the
per curiam decision in One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 371 (1958), holding that a particular
homosexual magazine was not obscene. The
obvious reason was that it did not appeal to
the prurient interest of the average person.
35Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).

Court correctly held, the statute was an
"over-kill" in that it applied standards
of obscenity for children to the control
of publications for everybody, including
adults for whom the publications might
not be obscene. In Manual Enterprises,
the federal postal regulation banned all
distribution through the mails of publications which were obscene for male
homosexuals in the community, but
which were not shown to be obscene for
the average person in the communitythus, an "over-kill." Had it been possible to identify the male homosexuals in
the community, and had the ban on distribution been limited in distribution to
them only, the case would have presented
the interesting issue of the "target audience" adaptation of the definition of,
and of the standards for the identification
of, obscene publications; but since such
identification of the distributees was impossible, no such issue was presented.
Since, however, children can be reasonably identified, the possibility of banning
dissemination to children of materials
obscene for children presented itself, at
least with respect to publications intended
for children as a target audience. Moreover, this consideration suggested a further possibility of banning, for distribution to children, even publications not
intended for children as a target audience
-and so Ginsberg, in which such a ban
was upheld as constitutional. I had al6
ready outlined this potentiality in 1963,3
because such an Illinois statute,' 7 drafted
by a group of lawyer-associates of mine,
had been enacted, only to be vetoed by

.16 Levy, supra note 29, at 644-45
37

(1963).
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the Governor of Illinois under circumstances under which a legislative override of that veto was impossible. In my
judgment, therefore, the requirement of
"patent offensiveness to the community
as a whole" is not an additional standard for the identification of the obscene,
but merely an inherent requirement for
any law which prohibits the dissemination
of obscene materials to everyone in the
relevant community.
(3)
In 1964, Jacobellis8 held that
there could be no weighing of dominant
prurient appeal against an element of
redeeming social value so as to overbalance the latter in order to conclude
that the material was obscene; if the
material had any element of redeeming
social importance, it could not be obscene. Hence, the utter lack of any
redeeming social value is an independent
essential element in identifying any material as obscene. In addition, even as
to a State or local law, the relevant
"community" must be the nation as a
whole and not the State or local community, because the right protected by
the Federal Constitution is necessarily a
nationwide right which cannot be affected by the vagaries of a local community."
Moreover, in the application
of the definition and standards of obscenity to any particular material, the
United States Supreme Court must make
its own independent determination unaffected by the determinations of any jury,
administrative agency, or lower court.

'S Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
89 Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion dissociated himself from this position. Id.
at 200-01.
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(4) In 1966, the Court decided three
cases, each of which contributed something to the evolution of the standards
for the identification of the obscene.
(a) In Memoirs, 0 the Court further
developed its position in Jacobellis by
holding that, where the issue was the obscenity of the material absent the circumstance of commercial exploitation, the
material must be utterly without redeeming social importance as a third and independent test in addition to dominant
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness
to the community as a whole. Memoirs,
therefore, represents the latest synthesis by
the Court of the standards to 'be used
for the identification of the obscene. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice White in
dissent thought that this so-called third
and independent standard was not really
an additional standard, but merely one
factor to be considered in determining
the standard of the dominant prurient appeal of the material taken as a whole.
I am unclear as to whether this may
mean that they subscribe to the "balancing" view.
(b)
In Ginsberg,41 the Court appears to have evolved a really new and
independent standard for the identification
of obscenity, by virtue of which, in order
to be constitutionally controllable as obscene for the average person in the community, material need not be obscene
for that average person under all possible circumstances. If the material is

40A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
'IlGinsberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
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being commercially exploited for its prurient appeal to the average person so
that it becomes the stock in trade of
the business of pandering, then, in that
circumstance, the material is obscene for
the average person even though, absent
42
such circumstance, it would not be.
This advertence to one circumstance attending the dissemination of the material,
and not solely to the nature of the material itself, as a standard to be used
in the determination of whether the material is obscene, is new.
Several of the experts in the law of
obscenity with whom I have discussed
the case are inclined to regard it as a
freak case, explicable basically by the
Court's reaction to the bold effrontery of
Mr. Ginsberg in nationally advertising in
advance that, under the Court's own
standards of obscenity, no law could constitutionally control his publication, which
would be the creme de la creme of
erotica. But this cynical view is, of
course, unacceptable.
The fact is that, from the very beginning, the Chief Justice had emphasized
that, in his view, the vice to be controlled, and the only vice which government could constitutionally control, was
precisely the commercial exploitation of
the morbid and shameful craving for materials having a prurient effect-a craving
which (though he did not say so) he
may have felt was latent in the average
person. Now faced with a blatant ex-

42

The reason it would not be obscene might be

either because its dominant theme did not
appeal to the prurient interest of the average
person or because it could not be said to have
no redeeming social importance.

ample of that vice, the fact that the
very standards by which the Court had
so meticulously circumscribed and delimited controllable obscenity might make
government powerless to deal with that
vice, must have been a bit of a shock,
especially when the exploiter himself had
confidently predicted that result in advance in national advertising. But there
was, of course, the hint in Kingsley Pictures 43 that the manner of presentation
of an idea might be significant in de-termining its controllability. So the circumstance of the manner of disseminating
an idea might be significant in determining its obscenity-might in fact tip the
scales in a borderline case so that, with
the circumstance of pandering, material
would be obscene which, absent that circumstance, would not. In addition, that
particular circumstance of pandering has
a direct relevance to at least two of the
three independent standards summarized
in Memoirs 14 as necessary for the conclusion that material is obscene: it makes
the material even more patently offensive
to current community standards of decency than it might otherwise be; and
the purveyor himself makes it clear that
he has no interest in any redeeming social importance which the material might
have, so that the law need then pay no
more attention to this factor than he
did. Hence, the holding in Ginsberg that,
given the circumstance of pandering, material which might not otherwise be obscene becomes so.

42 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of

the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
44A
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(c) In Mishkin,4" there was again the
circumstance of pandering but primarily
to a target audience of homosexuals and
lesbians. Since the law involved banned
the dissemination of "obscene" materials
to everyone in the community and not
merely to homosexuals and lesbians, the
case presents a curious anti-position of
Ginsberg against Manual Enterprisesof the relative significance of the circumstance of pandering, even though primarily to a target audience, against the
standard of patent offensiveness to current community standards of decency,
where dissemination of the materials was
banned to everybody in the community.
The circumstance of pandering prevailed,
even though limited primarily to the target audience-an impressive tribute to the
strength of the factor of commercial exploitation in determining the obscenity
of materials for the average person in
the community, although it is not as clear
here as it was in Manual Enterprises that
the material did not appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person in the community. The case is not an "adapted
audience" case because the New York
statute made no effort to adapt the
standards of obscenity to sexual deviates
and then to limit the ban on dissemination to those deviates only. The case is
really much more dramatic than that, because it holds that materials obscene
for deviates may fall within the definition
of materials obscene for the average person without any showing to that effect
where the additional circumstance of pandering exists.
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With the above review of the evolution
of the standards for the identification of
obscene materials, we are now in a position to appreciate the Ginsberg case,
in which the ban on dissemination of
materials obscene for youth (the adjusted
or adaptive audience) was restricted to
dissemination to youth only (i.e., to the
very same audience to which the definition and standards of the obscene had
been adapted, thus avoiding the constitutional flaw in Butler and, I think,
in Manual Enterprises),"7 but in which
the ban extended, not merely to materials
intended for dissemination to youth only
(the target audience factor) but to materials intended for dissemination to
everyone in the community. I must, however, as a final piece of background,
alert the reader to the fact that the opinion
in Ginsberg treats the constitutional issue
primarily in terms of the constitutionally
protected freedom of the youth, i.e., of
the expressionee rather than of the expressioner. This twist is involved owing
to the fact that freedom of expression is
viewed as necessarily involving both the
expressioner and the expressionee. If the
protected freedom of a minor-expressionee
may constitutionally be more restricted
than the protected freedom of an adultexpressionee, that constitutional restriction
on the minor-expressionee exerts a reflex impact on the protected freedom of
the expressioner (in this case, Ginsberg).
Hence, Mr. Ginsberg has a personal stake
in defending the unrestricted freedom of
the minor-expressionee, and we are treat46

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
"

4 Manual

45 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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ed to the anomaly of watching Mr. Ginsberg fight valiantly for the constitutionally protected freedom of a youth who
(together with his parent) couldn't care
less and actually doesn't want the freedom which Mr. Ginsberg is trying to
obtain for him-a situation calculated to
produce a mild schizophrenia in an unalerted reader.
In Ginsberg, the Court deals with a
New York penal law enacted in 19 65.48
Section 1 contains the definitions of all
terms used. Section 2 provides that it
is unlawful for any person knowingly to
sell to a minor
(a)

(b)

any visual representation which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors; or
any printed matter containing anything in paragraph (a) or containing explicit and detailed verbal
descriptions or narrative accounts
of sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse and
which, taken as a whole, is harmful
to minors.

Section 4 provides that violation of the
statute is a misdemeanor (the maximum
punishment for which is one year's imprisonment or a fine of $500 or both).
The key phrase "harmful to minors"
is defined in section 1 as follows: that
quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it (i) predominantly
appeals to the prurient, shameful or mor-

48 N.Y. PEN. LAW

bid interest of minors; and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect
to what is suitable material for minors;
and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
On each of two days in October, 1965,
a sixteen-year-old boy (enlisted to do so
by his mother, according to Mr. Justice
Fortas, so that Ginsberg could be prosecuted) picked from a display rack in
Ginsberg's luncheonette store two "girlie"
magazines of a type indistinguishable from
magazines which the United States Supreme Court had already held not to be
obscene for adults,'4 9 paid Ginsberg for
the magazines, and walked out of the
store.
Charged on information, Ginsberg was tried without a jury and found
guilty; the trial court found that the
magazines contained pictures depicting
female "nudity" (as defined in the statute), which pictures were "harmful to
minors" (as defined in the statute), and
that Ginsberg knowingly sold them to a
minor. The conviction was affirmed by
the Appellate Term of the Supreme
Court, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed.
The opinion of the Court is as follows:
(1) The state of the case is:
(a) Ginsberg contends solely that New
York has no power, under the Federal
Constitution, to adapt to minors the
three-pronged test of obscenity as formulated in Memoirs for everyone because

§ 484-h, as amended, N.Y.

PEN. LAW §§ 235.20-235.22.
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Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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the constitutional protection accorded to
a citizen cannot be made to depend on
whether that citizen is an adult or a
minor (citing Meyer,50 Pierce,51 and
Barnette 52 as analogous invasions of the
constitutionally protected rights of minors).
(b) New York contends that it does
have such power under the Federal
Constitution, because its own interest in
the welfare of its children-citizens enables
it to exercise its police power to bar the
distribution to minors of publications, the
distribution of which to adults it could
not constitutionally bar. On that issue,
the New York Court of Appeals has held
for the State in Bookcase, Inc. v. Brodcrick 1': publications which are constitutionally protected for distribution to
adults are not necessarily constitutionally
protected for distribution to minors, because the concept of constitutionally unprotected publications may vary according to the social group to whom the publications are directed or from whom they
are quarantined.
(2) We need not consider the impact
of constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression upon the totality of the relationship between a minor and the State
(citing Gault) .4 The issue here is mere-

0
- Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
52 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).

53 Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71,
218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1966).
54 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
I take
this citation to mean that Ginsberg and Gault
are not at odds, because different constitutional
rights of minors were involved.
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ly whether New York may constitutionally accord to minors a more restricted
freedom of expression than it must constitutionally accord to adults. We hold
that it may, and that this statute does
not over-exercise that power.
(3) A definition of obscenity (otherunobjectionable)
wise constitutionally
based on a prurient appeal to minors does
not violate the constitutionally protected
freedom of minors, but merely adjusts
the constitutional concept of obscenity to
social reality by permitting an assessment of its prurient appeal in terms of
the sexual interests of minors (citing
Mishkin and New York's Bookcase, Inc.).
(4) We reject any analogy to Meyer,
Pierce, or Barnette. The applicable precedent is Prince 5: the power of the
State to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond its authority over adults,
even where the crux is the invasion of
constitutionally protected freedoms.
(5) In this case, there exists a supervening State interest in the regulation of
expression sold to children owing to the
Hence, if
factor of their immaturity.
as the
to
find,
State
for
the
rational
it is
New York Legislature did, that the pubfished materials, as defined, are "harmful to minors" because they constitute "a
basic factor in impairing the ethical and
moral development of children and a
clear and present danger to the people
of the State," then two interests of the
State justify its action: legal support of
parents in the discharge of their primary
responsibility for the welfare of their

55Prince
(1944).

v.

Massachusetts,

321

U.S.
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children; and the State's own independent
interest in the welfare of its citizenchildren.
(6)
Is it rational for the State so to
find? It is doubtful if the legislative
finding quoted above is an accepted scientific fact, but the concensus of the studies
made is that the causal link is neither
proved nor disproved.
A clear and
present danger is not required in order
to justify the finding because obscenity,
as adequately defined, is not within the
protection of the First Amendment.
Hence, the Federal Constitution requires
merely that the New York Legislature not
be irrational in so finding. Since the
finding has not been disproved, it cannot be said to be irrational. The Fourteenth Amendment alone does not require
scientifically certain criteria.
(7) There is no unconstitutional vagueness involved because the statutory definition of "harmful to minors" is virtually
identical with the definition of obscenity
in Memoirs," and the New York judicial
construction of "knowingly" operates to
prohibit not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth to minors.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the First Amendment protects freedom of expression in
order to preserve a free trade in ideas,
and that it protects both the freedom of
the expressioner and the freedom of the
expressionee in order to protect a society
of free choice. But, he said, the freedom of the expressionee assumes a developed capacity to choose in the expres-

5'; A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).

sionee; if that is absent, government may
regulate the expressioner to prevent him
from foisting his views upon a captive
audience. A child is like a captive audience because he does not have a fully
developed capacity for choice. Hence,
the State may deprive a child of rights
of which it could not deprive an adult
(e.g., the right to vote; the right to
marry).
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which Mr. Justice Black
joined, has already been presented. Mr.
Justice Fortas, in dissent, has, as I see
it, just one principal point, viz., nonpandering book selling of publications
which are indistinguishable from those already held non-obscene for adults should
not be a hazardous occupation. Apropos
of this observation, I know that something akin to this consideration was the
basic reason for the veto by the Governor
of Illinois of the Illinois statute enacted
in 1963.5 7 That statute incorporated
(though not with equal precision of
drafting) the same concept as the New
York statute in adapting the definition
of obscene to minors while also limiting the ban on dissemination to minors.
The thinking behind the veto was that to
compel booksellers to conform to two
different standards of the obscene (the
adult standard and the minor's standard)
in the operation of their business would
make bookselling a hazardous occupation
which, in the absence of scientifically
verifiable evidence of any harm to minors,
was not worth the doing.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion, surveyed the disagreements which

57H.B. 1072, 73 111. Gen. Assembly (1963).
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still exist among the members of the
Court as to various aspects of this intractable constitutional problem even
after eleven years of reflection, and
noted among the American public an
utter bewilderment as to particular determinations which the Court has made.
He felt that the United States Supreme
Court had been reduced to mere secondguessing of state courts, and that in rare
instances only was there any substantial
interest in free speech at stake. His
conclusion was that there could be no
improvement until it is recognized that
the matter of obscenity is of primarily
state concern, and that the Federal Constitution tolerates much more discretion
in the states than in the Federal Government, and is even more tolerant of state
action in respect of juveniles. His functional solution is to limit federal regulation to hard-core pornography only, but
to limit the states only when they are
prudishly overzealous.
Without underestimating the significance
of Mr. Justice Harlan's disquieting observations and the great practical value
of his functional solution, I am nevertheless struck by what I consider a relatively rapid evolutionary case development of the substantive concept of obscenity to its present degree of sophistication. I view the notable refinement, in
little more than a decade, of the standards determining obscenity as a fine example of the genius of our law. Further refinement and adjustment, of course,
still lie ahead and the frustrating "grey
area" of specific application will always
exist, but the development of our constitutional law by the cases in all four
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categories of the generic problem of
controlling obscenity has been remarkable
in the time involved. Equally remarkable is how much of this development
was foreshadowed in the Roth case which
began it.
In short, I get the impression that
the constitutional law of obscenity has
"grown up". In these two latest cases,
there is even an air of urbanity in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, as though
he now recognizes that his view of the
all-encompassing scope of the First
Amendment is a lost cause over which
he can finally shrug his shoulders. In
reaction, perhaps, he comes very close
to equating the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process test for the constitutional validity of a legislative finding
(opinion) to the test for an insane delusion on the part of a testator in the
law of wills; but I sense more of a wry
humor than of bitterness in the reaction. His basic belief comes through in
his gibes at the "modern Comstockians",
who follow their preceptor in entertaining the opinion that the obscene publication has a harmful effect on the young,
whereas the Justice doubts the wisdom
of trying by law to put the fresh, evanescent, natural blooming of sex into the
category of "sin." Imagine Comstock's
dismay on learning that he is the preceptor of the standards for the identification of obscenity now summarized in
Memoirs, and the preceptor for the per
curiam determinations as to the nonobscenity of specific materials involved
therein. As for the Justice, perhaps we
may even anticipate that he will yet
(Continued on page 86)
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not only of the
Church, but of all mankind, especially
as available in modern disciplines, i.e.,
psychology, sociology, history, etc. Organic assimilation of these resources will
always reflect the distinctive character of
the Christian community.

(5) In all these respects, the medium
of mass communication offers multiple
possibilities. For this reason the process
of developing new formulations of law
should not only be non-secretive, and in
the public domain, but should in principle receive as wide publicity as possible
during the period of formulation.

OBSCENITY
(Continued)

dividual, obscenity, as adequately defined,
in the long run erodes public moral values
on which the common good is based.

realize that legislatures base their antiobscenity statutes, not on the private
moral standards involved in "sin", but
on the public moral standards involved in
the awareness (opinion) of the average
man that, sin or no sin for the in-

Far from being disappointed, then, I
am encouraged that the "intractable" legal
problem of obscenity is showing signs of
becoming tractable-another tribute to
the capacity of our constitutional law for
evolutionary development.

edge and experience,

